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INTRODUCTION
The landmark case of Li v. Yellow Cab Co.' developed the doc-
trine of comparative negligence in California. Li was based upon
equitable principles of fairness. The case established an equita-
ble precedent which was destined to be applied under different
fact situations which called for similar apportionments of fault.
Between defendants, the traditional manner of apportioning the
judgment has been contribution and indemnity. In California, the
doctrine of contribution is covered by a statute which requires the
pro rata apportionment of the judgment.2 The recent case of
American Motorcycle Association v. Superior Court3 developed
the doctrine of comparative indemnity which allows the appor-
tionment of fault among multiple tortfeasors. From an equitable
standpoint, the decision was a logical application of the compara-
tive fault concepts promulgated in Li.
1. 13 Cal. 3d 804, 532 P.2d 1226, 119 Cal. Rptr. 858 (1975). The plaintiff and de-
fendant in Li were involved in an automobile accident. Both the defendant and
the plaintiff were found to be negligent. Under the traditional contributory negli-
gence doctrine, applied by the trial court, the plaintiff's negligence was a complete
bar to her cause of action. The California Supreme Court reversed, adopting the
doctrine of "comparative negligence." The plaintiff's cause of action was not
barred, but the recoverable damages were reduced by her proportion of the total
fault. Li has been cited and commented upon in numerous law review articles.
See Braum, Contribution: A Fresh Look, 50 CAL. ST. B.J. 166 (1975); Englard, Li v.
Yellow Cab Co.-A Belated and Inglorious Centennial of the California Civil
Code, 65 CALIF. L. REV. 4 (1977); George and Walkowiak, Blame and Reparation in
Pure Comparative Negligence: The Multi-Party Action, 8 Sw. L. REV. 1, 2 (1976);
Levine, Strict Products Liability and Comparative Negligence: The Collision of
Fault and No-Fault, 14 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 337, 351 (1977); Rosenburg, Anything
Legislatures Can Do Courts Can Do Better?, 62 A.B.A.J. 587 (1976); Schwartz, Li v.
Yellow Cab Company: A Survey of California Practice Under Comparative Negli-
gence, 7 PAC. L.J. 747 (1976); Comment, Comparative Negligence, Multiple Parties,
and Settlements, 65 CALIF. L. REV. 1264 (1977); Comment, Comparative Fault and
Strict Products Liability: Are They Compatible?, 5 PEPPERDINE L. REV. 501 (1978);
Note, Third Party and Employer Liability After Nga Li v. Yellow Cab Company
for Injuries to Employees Covered by Workers' Compensation, 50 S. CAL. L. REV.
1029 (1977); Note, Products Liability, Comparative Negligence, and the Allocation
of Damages Among Multiple Defendants, 50 S. CAL. L. REV. 73 (1976).
2. CAL. CODE Crv. Puoc. §§ 875, 876 (West Supp. 1978).
3. 20 Cal. 3d 578, 578 P.2d 899, 146 Cal. Rptr. 182 (1978).
Prior to the recent case of Daly v. General Motors Corp.,4 the
relative fault of a negligent plaintiff was not applied against a de-
fendant who was found liable on the basis of strict products liabil-
ity. The strictly liable defendant was responsible for the whole of
the plaintiff's injuries even though the plaintiff was partially re-
sponsible. The court in Daly recognized this as an inequitable re-
sult and decided to allow the jury to make an allocation of relative
fault between a negligent plaintiff and a strictly liable defendant.
The negligent plaintiff's judgment would be reduced according to
his respective allocation of fault.
The principle case, Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Nest-Kart,5 extended
the concepts of allocation among defendants and plaintiffs devel-
oped in Daly to the allocation of fault among multiple defend-
ants. From an historical perspective, the developments in Daly
and Nest-Kart are factually similar to Li and American
Motorcycle in that both began initially between plaintiffs and de-
fendants and were subsequently applied among multiple defend-
ants. The paramount principle throughout this historical
progression is the allocation of liability for damages in direct pro-
portion to one's respective fault as mandated by Li.6 The present
analysis of Nest-Kart considers both comparative indemnity and
the apportionment of strict liability, followed by their future im-
plications for California tort law.
FACTS
The plaintiff was injured while using a shopping cart owned by
Safeway Stores, Inc. The plaintiff sued Safeway and the manufac-
turer of the cart, Nest-Kart, for damages incurred from the in-
jury.7 The jury was directed to first find on which, if any, grounds
the defendants were liable, and second, to determine the relative
fault between the parties. Safeway was found liable on the theo-
ries of negligence and strict products liability and was held eighty
percent responsible for the accident. Nest-Kart was found liable
solely on a strict liability theory and was held responsible for
twenty percent of the injury.
Safeway and Nest-Kart initially satisfied the judgment on the
4. 20 Cal. 3d 725, 575 P.2d 1162, 144 Cal. Rptr. 380 (1978).
5. 21 Cal. 3d 322, 579 P.2d 441, 146 Cal. Rptr. 550 (1978).
6. See Li v. Yellow Cab Co., 13 Cal. 3d 804, 813, 532 P.2d 1226, 1232, 119 Cal.
Rptr. 858, 864 (1975), and Daly v. General Motors Corp., 20 Cal. 3d 725, 737, 575 P.2d
1162, 1169, 144 Cal. Rptr. 380, 387 (1978).
7. Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Nest-Kart, 21 Cal. 3d 322, 325, 579 P.2d 441, 442, 146
Cal. Rptr. 550, 551 (1978). Technibilt Corp., which occasionally repaired some of
Safeway's shopping carts, was also sued but the jury found Technibilt to be free
from fault. The jury also found the plaintiff to be free from fault.
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eighty-twenty proportion as determined by the jury. Safeway
subsequently asked for contribution from Nest-Kart. The trial
court applied sections 875 and 876 of the California Code of Civil
Procedure and granted Safeway contribution on a fifty-fifty basis.
It is from this ruling that Nest-Kart appealed to the California
Supreme Court.8 Nest-Kart contended that the jury's apportion-
ment of fault should have been the basis of dividing the judgment
and not the fifty-fifty pro rata division under the contribution stat-
ute.
COMPARATIVE INDEMNITY
Traditionally, contribution and indemnity have been considered
two separate and distinct doctrines.
[QJuestions as to the apportionment of damages among multiple
tortfeasors were seen as presenting solely an issue of contribution; the eq-
uitable indemnity doctrine, by contrast, was viewed historically as an all-
or-nothing concept concerned only with the complete shifting of liability
from one tortfeasor to another, rather than with the sharing of liability be-
tween the two.9
The contribution theory apportioned damages on a pro rata basis
without taking relative fault into consideration. Fault was consid-
ered in the theory of indemnity, but only as to the question of
whether indemnity was to be granted in the first place. 1o Indem-
nity worked equitably in extreme cases where one defendant's
fault was "active" and the other defendant's fault "passive," but
equity was not served in less extreme cases by contribution.
Fault would be unequal but insufficient for indemnification.
In American Motorcycle," the court developed comparative in-
demnity so as to avoid the inequities of traditional indemnity.
The new doctrine allocates, between the defendants, the judg-
8. Id. at 325-27, 579 P.2d at 442-44, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 551-53.
9. Id. at 328, 579 P.2d at 444, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 553.
10. Indemnity has traditionally involved the so called active-passive analysis
of the defendant's fault. This test focused on the kind of fault and not the degree
of fault. Exactly what was active or passive fault has been a matter of confusion
for the courts. See Gardner v. Murphy, 54 Cal. App. 3d 164, 126 Cal. Rptr. 302
(1975); Niles v. City of San Rafael, 42 Cal. App. 3d 230, 116 Cal. Rptr. 733 (1974);
Kerr Chemicals, Inc. v. Crown Cork & Seal Co., 21 Cal. App. 3d 1010, 99 Cal. Rptr.
162 (1971). The confusion did not arise out of an inability to define the terms, but
out of the difficulty of dealing with the all-or-nothing nature of indemnity.
11. 20 Cal. 3d at 491-99, 578 P.2d at 907-12, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 190-95 (1978). The
court relied heavily upon Ford Motor Co. v. Robert J. Poeschl, Inc., 21 Cal. App. 3d
694, 98 Cal. Rptr. 702 (1971). The court in Poeschl discussed the unfairness of tradi-
tional indemnity and contribution and indicated that the comparative fault basis
of apportionment would be more equitable.
ment in direct proportion to each defendant's respective fault.
Lower California court cases, along with cases from other states,
were cited in American Motorcycle to illustrate the inequity of
traditional indemnity, but Li was the determinative factor in the
court's decision to modify traditional indemnity. 12 The court re-
lied upon the mandate of Li to establish "a system under which
liability for damage will be borne by those whose negligence
caused it in direct proportion to their respective fault."13
The fundamental rationale for the mandate of Li is to promote
responsibility for one's actions. A person should be held respon-
sible for his actions but not for the actions of others. If the bur-
den upon one party is larger than his actual responsibility, then
the other parties are not encouraged to act in a careful manner.
To have all parties responsible for their individual behavior pro-
motes accident-reducing behavior, or in the alternative, deters
dangerous conduct.' 4
The more perplexing issue faced in American Motorcycle was
whether the legislature in enacting California's contribution stat-
ute15 precluded the court from developing comparative indem-
nity.' 6 The court made a strict distinction between the
legislatively-developed doctrine of contribution and the court-de-
veloped doctrine of indemnity. The court reasoned that since in-
demnity was developed by the court, it could therefore be
modified by the court. After examining the statute, the court con-
cluded that the legislature did not intend to limit the development
of comparative indemnity, and decided to develop the doctrine as
a present evolution of the common law. The majority opinion in
Nest-Kart reaffirmed the American Motorcycle decision.' 7 The
trial court's ruling which allowed apportionment on a pro rata ba-
sis was reversed and directions were given to allow apportion-
12. The court referred to Dole v. Dow Chemical Co., 30 N.Y.2d 143, 331 N.Y.S.2d
382 (1972), which judicially developed partial indemnification in New York. See
Kelly v. Long Island Lighting Co., 331 N.Y.2d 25, 334 N.Y.S.2d 851 (1972).
13. Li v. Yellow Cab Co., 13 Cal. 3d 804, 813, 532 P.2d 1226, 1232, 119 Cal. Rptr.
858, 864 (1975).
14. See text at note 28 infra.
15. CAL. CODE Civ. Ploc. §§ 875, 876 (West Supp. 1978).
16. 20 Cal. 3d at 599-605, 578 P.2d at 912-16, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 195-99. "The legisla-
tive history of the 1957 contribution statute quite clearly demonstrates that the
purpose of the legislation was simply 'to lessen the harshness' of the then prevail-
ing common law no contribution rule. Nothing in the legislative history suggests
that the legislature intended by the enactment to preempt the field or to foreclose
future judicial developments which further the act's principal purpose of amelio-
rating the harshness and inequity of the old no contribution rule. Under these cir-
cumstances, we see no reason to interpret the legislation as establishing a bar to
judicial innovation." Id. at 601, 578 P.2d at 914, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 197 (footnote omit-
ted).
17. 21 Cal. 3d at 328, 579 P.2d at 444, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 553 (1978).
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ment on a relative fault basis.18
APPORTIONMENT OF STRICT PRODUCTS LIALiTY
The primary issue raised by Nest-Kart is "whether the compar-
ative fault principle of Li should be utilized as the basis for ap-
portioning liability between two tortfeasors, one whose liability
rests upon California's strict products liability doctrine and the
other whose liability derives, at least in part, from negligence the-
ory."19 This issue was decided in the affirmative. There are two
main arguments against such apportionment of liability: first, to
do so would frustrate the very purpose of strict liability, and sec-
ond, no standards exist upon which to compare the two theories.
The latter argument will be considered first.
Negligence is based upon the acts of the defendant. Did the de-
fendant act as an average reasonable man would under like or
similar circumstances? On the other hand, strict liability does not
focus upon the acts of the defendant, but primarily upon the prod-
uct.20 Whether the defendant was negligent is not the determina-
tive factor for liability. Hence, the basis for strict liability is
considered to be "no fault" and the basis for negligence to be
"fault." How does one compare "fault" and "no fault"? A number
of commentators have concluded that such a comparison is like
comparing apples and oranges. 21 The court's response to such ar-
guments was basically pragmatic in nature.
From a practical standpoint, the court concluded that no funda-
mental obstacles existed to prevent the application of apportion-
ment. In the present case the jury was able to allocate fault22
18. Nest-Kart was tried prior to the decision in American Motorcycle, so the
issue of the retroactive application of American Motorcycle arose. The court de-
cided in favor of its application: "[Wihen-as in the instant case-the issue of
comparative contribution or indemnity has been properly preserved below, no un-
due surprise or unfairness will result in applying the American Motorcycle deci-
sion to cases presently pending upon appeal." Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Nest-Kart,
21 Cal. 3d 322, 333, 579 P.2d 441, 447, 146 Cal. Rptr. 550, 556 (1978).
19. 21 Cal. 3d at 325, 579 P.2d at 442, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 551.
20. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS § 99, p. 658 (4th ed. 1971).
21. See Boone, Comparative Negligence: Solution or Problem?, CAL. TRIAL
LAW. A.J. 17, 33 (Fall 1975); Levine, Strict Products Liability and Comparative Neg-
ligence: The Collision of Fault and No-Fault, 14 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 337, 351-56
(1977).
22. The trial court gave the following direction to the jury: "The word fault'
as used herein, means a defective product or negligence which was a proximate
cause of the accident." Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Nest-Kart, 21 Cal. 3d 322, 326 n.1, 579
P.2d 441, 443 n.1, 146 Cal. Rptr. 550, 552 n.1 (1978) (emphasis added).
among the defendants even though one defendant was strictly lia-
ble. The court emphasized that this practical experience and the
experience of other states23 was evidence enough to allow such
apportionment. The pragmatic nature of the decision is apparent.
The court appears to have said that if something works, let us not
argue about why it should not. The decision was a very practical
way of avoiding an academically sensitive issue.
Justice Clark, in his concurring opinion, took issue with the ma-
jority's practical approach. "While the jury determined Safeway
was 80 percent at fault," observed Clark, "it could just as well
have concluded the manufacturer was 80 percent at fault. Such
division is clearly arbitrary because it is standardless." 24 The ma-
jority emphasized the equity of its approach, but if Justice Clark
is correct, then the ultimate result is inequitable. Clark called on
the legislature to reclaim its rightful role by reaffirming the con-
tribution statutes. Assuming Clark's approach to be correct, pro
rata apportionment would be more equitable than comparative in-
demnity. The pro rata standard is fixed and less arbitrary than
the jury's standardless determination. It can only be said that the
majority demonstrated a higher degree of faith in the jury's abil-
ity to make such apportionments.
The second argument against the allocation of liability was de-
veloped in the dissenting opinion by Justice Mosk. In his dissent,
Mosk argued that apportionment should not take place because it
would detract from the very purpose of strict liability.25 The pur-
pose of strict products liability, as stated in the landmark case,
Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc.,26 which developed the
doctrine, "is to insure that the costs of injuries resulting from de-
fective products are borne by the manufacturers that put such
products on the market .. ."27 If fault is allocated to a plaintiff,
then the full burden of the injury resulting from the defective
product would not be borne by the manufacturer. As a result, the
purpose of the doctrine would be partially defeated.
The majority opinion rebutted Justice Mosk's criticism by con-
cluding that the policy to place the burden upon the strictly liable
manufacturer is not so predominating that it should permit a neg-
ligent party to escape responsibility for his wrong. One of the pri-
23. See Gies v. Nissen Corp., 57 Wis. 2d 371, 204 N.W.2d 519, 526-27 (1973); City
of Franklin v. Badger Ford Truck Sales, Inc., 58 Wis. 2d 641, 207 N.W.2d 866, 871-73
(1973); Noble v. Desco Shoe Corp., 41 App. Div. 2d 908, 343 N.Y.S.2d 134, 136 (1973).
24. 21 Cal. 3d at 325, 579 P.2d at 448, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 557.
25. Id. at 336 (Justice Mosk's dissent is not included in the California Reporter
or the Pacific Reporter).
26. 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1963).
27. Id. at 63, 377 P.2d at 901, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 701.
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mary objectives of tort law is the "deterrence of dangerous
conduct [and the] encouragement of accident-reducing behav-
ior. .. *"28 If a party is allowed to avoid responsibility for his con-
duct then the deterrence objective is totally defeated. Under such
circumstances, the negligent party is not discouraged from acting
in a negligent manner. The majority in Nest-Kart apparently pre-
ferred the partial frustration of the purpose of strict liability, to
the total frustration of the deterrence objective. The court bal-
anced the two policies and concluded that the deterrence function
is to be given preference. Prior California cases allowing contri-
bution among negligent and strictly liable defendants were cited
by the court to illustrate that the purpose of strict liability was
never so paramount as to forbid apportionment.29 This is another
example of the court's practical approach to decision-making.
FUTURE IMPLICATIONS
Nest-Kart is significant as the most recent segment of the trend
allowing apportionment of fault which began with Li. Apportion-
ment of fault is now allowed between plaintiffs and defendants
and among multiple defendants, irrespective of whether fault is
based upon negligence or strict products liability. The procedural
impact of the decision is discussed below.
From the perspective of the trial itself, Nest-Kart would not
seem to have the impact of Li. Prior to Li, contributory negli-
gence operated as complete bar to the plaintiff's recovery. Al-
though traditional indemnity was an all or nothing remedy, the
pro rata contribution doctrine was also available to the defend-
ants. A similar alternative was not available to the contributorily
negligent plaintiff.
The court in American Motorcycle reaffirmed the traditional
doctrine holding all joint tortfeasors jointly and severally liable
for the plaintiff's judgment.30 From the viewpoint of the plaintiff,
each of the defendants is still liable for the full judgment. Nest-
28. Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Nest-Kart, 21 Cal. 3d 322, 330, 579 P.2d 441, 445, 146
Cal. Rptr. 550, 554 (1978).
29. Barth v. B.F. Goodrich Tire Co., 15 Cal. App. 3d 137, 92 Cal. Rptr. 809 (1971);
Kerr Chemicals, Inc. v. Crown Cork & Seal Co., 21 Cal. App. 3d 1010, 99 Cal. Rptr.
162 (1971); Pearson Ford Co. v. Ford Motor Co., 273 Cal. App. 2d 269, 78 Cal. Rptr.
279 (1969).
30. American Motorcycle Ass'n v. Superior Court, 20 Cal. 3d 578, 586-91, 578
P.2d 899, 903-07, 146 Cal. Rptr. 182, 186-90 (1978).
Kart does not affect this existing relationship between plaintiffs
and multiple defendants. Its application is solely to allocation of
the judgment among the defendants.
The effect of Nest-Kart and Daly upon strict products liability
depends primarily upon the jury's ability to compare negligence
and strict products liability. On a theoretical level, the question
of whether the jury has the requisite capabilities is still in dis-
pute, but from a practical standpoint it will be difficult to deter-
mine if, in fact, it has such capabilities. A jury's verdict is
examined only after the fact; as a result, how the decision was
reached is not known. Since it is the jury's duty to decide the is-
sues of fact, substantial weight is given to their decision in any
subsequent review. California Code of Civil Procedure § 657(7),
concerning the standard for a new trial, states in pertinent part:
A new trial shall not be granted upon the ground of insufficiency of the
evidence to justify the verdict or other decision, nor upon the ground of
excessive or inadequate damages, unless after weighing the evidence the
court is convinced from the entire record, including reasonable inferences
therefrom, that the court or jury clearly should have reached a different
verdict or decision. 3
1
This standard for a new trial makes exceedingly rare the review
of a jury's findings.
Alleged disparities in the jury's verdict may be due to normal
variations in deciding issues of fact or to the jury's inability to
compare negligence and strict liability. Which is the controlling
factor? The author predicts that the answer to this question will
never be known. As the majority in Nest-Kart rationalized, "the
jury evidently concluded that while the defectiveness of the shop-
ping cart partially caused the accident, the primary fault for the
accident lay with Safeway because of its negligent failure prop-
erly to maintain the cart in safe working condition."32 Such ratio-
nalizations will make it difficult to overturn the jury's findings of
fact.33
It is clear from Nest-Kart that comparative indemnity is to be
given priority over contribution. Under California's contribution
statute,34 Safeway was entitled to contribution. Having paid
eighty percent of the judgment, Safeway had contributed more
than its pro rata share and had satisfied the statute. Nest-Kart re-
versed the trial court's ruling and allowed comparative indemnity.
It is evident that contribution will not be allowed in the future
31. CAL. CODE Crv. PROC. § 657 (West 1976).
32. Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Nest-Kart, 21 Cal. 3d 322, 330, 579 P.2d 441, 445, 146
Cal. Rptr. 550, 554 (1978).
33. See generally F. JAMES & G. HAZARD, CIVIL PROCEDURE §§ 7.20, 7.22 (2d ed.
1977) for a discussion of the review of jury findings (new trial and judgment not
withstanding the verdict).
34. CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. §§ 875, 876 (West Supp. 1978).
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where the jury has made an allocation of respective fault. The
contribution statute was not ruled unconstitutional, but from a
procedural standpoint the result is substantially the same.
CONCLUSION
The mandate of Li to develop a system in which the burden for
damages is to be allocated in direct proportion to one's fault has
been brought closer to reality by the Nest-Kart decision. Compar-
ative indemnity emerged in American Motorcycle and apportion-
ment of strict products liability was developed in Daly. Both
concepts have been reaffirmed in Nest-Kart. The pragmatic ap-
proach of the court made the decision possible.
Comparative fault is now available to apportion damages among
plaintiffs and defendants, and among multiple defendants. All
parties are now encouraged to be responsible for their respective
conduct. The deterrence of dangerous conduct, which was the un-
derlying rationale of Li, has been significantly advanced. This
can only result in a more responsible and equitable legal system.
DAVID R. HAGLUND

